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Abstract
This paper makes the following point: “detracking” schools, that is
preventing them from allocating students to classes according to their
ability, may lead to an increase in income residential segregation. It does
so in a simple model where households care about the school peer group
of their children. If ability and income are positively correlated, tracking
implies that some high income households face the choice of either living
in the areas where most of the other high income households live and
having their child assigned to the low track, or instead living in lower
income neighbourhoods where their child would be in the high track.
Under mild conditions, tracking leads to an equilibrium with partial
income desegregation where perfect income segregation would be the
only stable outcome without tracking.
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1 Introduction
Tracking is the practice of allocating the pupils of a school to different classes
according to their academic ability. Tracking is highly controversial and has
generated an often heated academic and policy debate;1 this has typically fo-
cused on the effects of tracking on educational attainment and other students’
outcomes, such as post-education earnings.2 In this paper we look beyond the
educational output, and examine the effects of tracking on the degree of income
segregation in residential areas and their schools. Central to the paper is the
idea that the characteristics of local schools are an important determinant of
households’ location choices.3 One such characteristic is whether or not the
local school tracks its students. Tracking affects the peer group, an important
input in the educational production function, and thereby it becomes one of the
determinants of households’ location choices and hence of the socio-economic
composition of a residential area and its schools. In turn, these choices are rele-
vant to society, because, for example, a residential pattern where households of
different socio-economic background live near one another reduces ghettoes, ex-
poses disadvantaged adolescents to lifestyles, behaviours and ambitions typical
of classmates and friends from more disparate social backgrounds, and might
enhance social mobility. Understanding the nature of the link between schools’
policies regarding tracking and residential income segregation in a given geo-
graphical area becomes therefore very important. Our paper is a step in this
1The early analysis of Coleman and his co-authors (Coleman et al 1966) already considers
the effects of tracking; the turning point towards “detracking” is discussed in Wheelock (1992)
and Argys et al (1996). A comprehensive survey of the initial debate among educationalists
is Lucas (1999).
2Betts (2011) reviews the empirical literature on the effects of tracking, and Brunello and
Checchi (2007) and Hanushek and Wßmann (2006) provide an up-to-date overview of the
international differences in extent and implementation of tracking.
3Here again the literature is vast; Calabrese et al (2012) build a general equilibrium
model to study the welfare implications of Tiebout sorting (1956). Using a similar setting,
Nechyba (1999) investigates the effect of private schools on residential segregation and on
school segregation in a metropolitan area. De Bartolome and Ross (2003, 2004, 2007) and
Hanushek and Yilmaz (2010) analyse the interactions between Tiebout type incentives and
the trade-off between geographical access and land space first studied by Alonso (1964).
Recent studies of the link between school performance and housing prices are Downes and
Zabel (2002), Dhar and Ross (2012), Clapp et al (2008), Gibbons and Machin (2003) and
Bayer et al (2007). Black and Machin (2011) is an extensive review of the empirical literature.
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hitherto untrodden direction.
Our main result is straightforward and simply stated: tracking may weaken
income segregation, that is the tendency of households to cluster according to
income and socio-economic status. Our paper contributes to the policy debate
on tracking by showing that the trend towards “detracking American schools”
(Argys et al 1996) might well have the probably unintended consequence of
exacerbating income segregation and of thus hampering social mobility.
Empirically, income segregation has long been observed not to match the
complete stratification predicted by a nave Tiebout-type location model (Pack
and Pack 1977, Persky 1990, Calabrese et al 2006). Explanations for the high
degree of income mixing have ranged from a two-dimensional distribution of
households’ characteristics (Epple and Platt 1998, Epple and Romano 2003),
to the interactions between income differences in commuting costs and the
strength of the preference for public goods (de Bartolome and Ross 2003, 2004,
2007), to the way in which the marginal rate of substitution between commuting
and housing varies with income (LeRoy and Sonstelie 1983). Our findings
add a further possible explanation for the observed level of income mixing,
and they are in line with some recent empirical evidence showing that social
mobility is larger when schools select students by past performance rather than
by residential location (Lee 2011a and 2011b).
We build a simple stylised model. Households choose where to live, and
property prices adjust to demand and supply. The quality of the education re-
ceived by their children is one of the variables which influences households’ lo-
cation choices. We compare two alternative policy scenarios, one where schools
track students, the other where the allocation of students to classes is ran-
dom. We show that when schools do not track students, the equilibrium is
such that households are fully segregated by income: all the poor live in one
district and all the rich live in the other. On the other hand, when schools
track their students, in equilibrium both rich and poor live in both districts,
and their children attend the same schools. The intuition for this “desegrega-
tion” equilibrium is easily explained. It hinges on two linchpins, both solidly
established in the literature: the peer group effect4 and the positive correlation
4Intuition and casual observation suggest that children learn from each other, because
they help, or hamper, one another, because they stimulate each other, because they compete
to do well, and so on. Moreover, when schools track students, classes comprise students of
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between a child’s ability and her socio-economic background.5 When the peer
group a child has at school matters to her parents, and when there is a posi-
tive correlation between ability and socio-economic background, parents from
a high socio-economic background whose children are of middling ability face
a dilemma: they have to choose between living in a district with many other
households of good socio-economic background where however their child is
likely to be placed in the low track, and living in a district with fewer house-
holds of high socio-economic background, but a higher chance that their child
is in the top track at school, and thus benefits from a higher ability peer group.
This dilemma is similar in nature to the choice that parents face in Epple et
al (2002), where profit-maximising private schools compete with homogenous
public schools in a given district. When public schools track their students,
they attract more high ability students while losing some lower ability ones
from richer households to private schools. The children of parents who opt for
those private schools have a lower quality peer group than the public school
high track but a higher quality peer group than the public school low track.6
Lest contemplation of this dilemma be considered beyond households’ actual
behaviour, note the intriguing evidence revealed by Cullen et al (2013) and
Estevan et al (2012). These papers show that indeed households do behave
strategically to benefit from school policies: students in Texas “trade down”,
similar abilities, and teachers are less likely to slow down or repeat their lessons to make
sure weaker students keep up, and can press ahead with the syllabus instead. Winkler (1975)
Arnott and Rowse (1987), de Bartolome (1990) are early economic analyses of the impact of
peer group effects; Astin (1993) an influential education one. There is also ample empirical
evidence documenting their importance. Bishop (2006), Sacerdote (2011) and Epple and
Romano (2011) are recent surveys of the vast economic literature.
5Sirin’s meta-analysis of around 75 studies published in the 90’s finds an average cor-
relation of 0.299 (Sirin 2005, p 437), in line with the figure of 0.343 in the earlier studies
considered by White (1982). An early economic analysis is Perl (1973). Notice that this
assumption does not imply a positive correlation between innate ability and socio-economic
background, as it could be the consequence of greater pre-school parental investment by
better-off parents.
6Hidalgo (2010) compares tracking to a comprehensive school system, and, in her main
result, finds that tracking may be the system providing greater equality of opportunities in
the sense of Roemer (1998). Other theoretical contributions on the relative merits of selective
versus comprehensive schooling systems include Brunello et al (2007), Eisenkopf (2009), Takii
and Tanaka (2009) and Hidalgo (2011).
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that is they choose a school with fewer able children in order to be more likely
to be in the “Ten Percent” of ablest children in the school and so gain automatic
admission to a state university.
Though the intuition for our main result might appear convincing, it is
important to check that it is not unravelled by the simultaneous decisions of
all households and by the operation of the property market. In Propositions 2
and 3, therefore, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions on the joint
distribution of income and ability such that when schools practice tracking,
households residential choices display income desegregation. As we argue, these
conditions are not very stringent.
The paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section 2: the
households in 2.1, the schools in 2.2, the housing market in 2.3. In Section 3,
after some preliminaries and definitions, in 3.1, we derive in turn the equilibrium
when schools do not track their students, subsection 3.2, and when they do:
the desegregation equilibrium in 3.3, and the full segregation equilibrium in 3.4.
Subsection 3.5 briefly discusses the intuition underlying our results and their
possible consequences, and Section 3.6 carries out limited welfare comparisons.
Section 4 concludes, and the Appendices contain some mathematical details.
2 The model
2.1 The households
We study a given population of households, with size normalised to 1, living in
a stylised city with two geographically separate neighbourhoods, or districts,
labelled 0 and 1. Households differ in income (a shorthand term for socio-
economic background) and in the ability of their children. Both income and
ability are exogenously given. We assume that income can take only two values,
yR and yP < yR; a proportion α of the households has income yR, and the
rest has income yP . For the sake of brevity we will often refer to households
with income yR and yP as “rich” and “poor”. Ability is measured by a uni-
dimensional parameter b ∈
[
b, b
]
. We choose a simplified model in order both
to present our result as starkly as possible, and also to show that the more
“complicated” equilibrium where households residential choices lead to mixing
of households with different socio-economic backgrounds can emerge even in
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a highly simplified set-up, with the deck, as it were, stacked against complex
outcomes.
Let Φi (b) be the distribution of households with income yi: Φi (b) is the
mass of households with income yi where the child has ability b or less. Φi (b)
satisfies: ΦP (b) = ΦR (b) = 0 and ΦP
(
b
)
= 1−α and ΦR
(
b
)
= α. We capture
the assumption of a positive correlation between ability and income by imposing
ΦP (b)
1−α
>
ΦR(b)
α
for every b ∈
(
b, b
)
: the ability distribution of children in high
income households first-order stochastically dominates the ability distribution
in low income households.
Households have identical preferences, represented by a utility function in-
creasing in consumption, x, in the child’s ability, b, and in the quality of the
education the child receives, θ. This functional form is assumed often (e.g.
Epple et al 2002; Caucutt 2002) and it captures the natural assumptions that
parents care about their children’s future prospects, that these are affected by
their educational achievement, and that this in turn depends on their abil-
ity and the quality of the school attended.7 Following a practice established
since at least de Bartolome (1990), we simplify the utility function by imposing
additivity in its three arguments: a household’s utility is
U (x, a (θ, b)) = v (x) + θ + q (b) . (1)
with v′ (x) > 0, v′′ (x) < 0, q′ (b) > 0.
A restriction in (1) is that the marginal impact of an improvement in the
peer group on achievement is constant; another is that bright and less bright
children benefit equally from peer quality.8 These restrictions make (1) suitable
to the analysis of the paper, both because they make it more tractable, and
because, as argued above, a simpler set-up brings out the main result more
starkly. One plausible characteristic of (1) is the fact that the marginal rate of
substitution between school quality and other consumption goods is increasing
7Given the static nature of the model we consider, it makes no difference to assume instead
that households are affected by the child future income, as in Ferna´ndez and Rogerson (1998,
p 816), or by her adult utility as in Loury (1981).
8Complementarities between ability and school quality would generate income mixing
(Epple and Romano 2003). Ruling them out thus avoids confounding that effect with the
income mixing effect of tracking. Furthermore, the available empirical evidence is still incon-
clusive as to whether the benefit of a better peer group is greater for bright or for less bright
children (Betts 2011).
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in income, which captures the important stylised fact that willingness to pay
for school quality is higher for better-off households.
2.2 The schools
There is one school in each district. Attendance to school is free and compul-
sory, in the sense that children must attend the school in their district, which
provides all the education they receive: we therefore rule out private schools
and school choice within the state school sector, with the consequence that par-
ents cannot choose a school, and hence an academic peer group, different from
that of their local public school. This is clearly in contrast with the practice in
many countries, but note that sending a child to a private school or to a faraway
state school carries a cost in tuition fees or additional transportation costs (as
modelled by, among others, Epple and Romano, 1998 and 2003 and Caucutt,
2002). Therefore it seems logical to postulate that, the higher this cost, the
more likely parents are to send their child to the local state school. Our set-up
therefore amounts to taking the extreme case for this plausible assumption,
that this cost is prohibitively high.9
Although each school has a fixed size, this does not mean that children at
the school all enjoy the same quality of education: typically, schools have many
classes for each school-year, and how the school forms its classes determines a
student’s peer group, and hence affects his or her learning. “Tracking” is the
practice of dividing students into groups of similar ability. Analytically, track-
ing amounts to having an increasing relationship between a child’s ability and
the quality of the education she receives. With tracking, this is a straightfor-
ward consequence of the fact that abler children enjoy a “better” peer group.
To capture the peer group effect, we take θ, the quality of the education re-
ceived, to be a function of the abilities of all the children in the track. With
little further loss of generality, we follow the simplification of much of the lit-
9In the light of Calsamiglia et al (2013), our set-up is in fact more general: their analysis
reveals that two widely used school choice mechanisms –the so-called Boston Mechanism
and the Deferred Acceptance (Gale-Shapley) mechanism– generate the same incentives as
the purely residence-based admission policies assumed here if schools give priority to local
residents. Therefore our results apply equally to settings where school choice is possible but
where schools give priority to local applicants. This is usually the case in practice.
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erature (e.g. Epple and Romano 1998, Nechyba 2003, Hidalgo 2010)10 and let
θ simply denote the average ability of the students in a given student’s class.
We also assume that each school has two classes of equal size, and that it can
observe the ability of its students.11 Parents understand the school policy, and
also know the ability of their child, and, in equilibrium, correctly anticipate
which track she would be placed in at each school.12 We formalise all this as
follows.
Assumption 1 Let B be the median ability of the students in a school. If the
school practices tracking, students with ability above or equal to B are assigned
to one track; students with ability below B are assigned to the other track. If
the school does not practice tracking, the allocation of students to classes is
random.
We label the high and low tracks H and L, for students above and below
the median respectively.
Assumption 1 admits a different interpretation. Suppose each neighbour-
hood has two ex-ante identical schools, each of size 1
4
. If school A is believed
10A slightly more general set-up is in Summers and Wolfe’s early empirical analysis (1977).
They consider two summary statistics of the distribution, the proportion of children with
ability below a certain threshold and the proportion of children with ability above a different
threshold.
11This assumes that the track placement in a school is fully determined by the ability
distribution of the children of that school. In practice of course the “absolute” ability of the
children would affect the track placement, thus the top track might be large in schools with
more able children: as will become apparent, the result of the paper depends only on there
being a sufficient number of children who would be in the top track in one district and in the
lower track in a different district, where there are more abler children. The evidence from
the “Ten Percent” mentioned in the Introduction (Cullen et al 2013, Estevan et al 2012),
does indicate that a child’s ability relative to her peers affects her track placement.
12We could make alternative assumptions; for example that schools choose the class size,
and they observe ability with an error. Such assumptions, however, would simply complicate
the model without adding any interesting insight, and so blur the mechanism underlying
our main results. We conjecture that other plausible model would also generate segregation
without tracking and mixing with tracking: for example, let households have the same in-
come, as well as the same preferences, but different education, and suppose parents observe
their child ability with an error, and educated parents make smaller errors. Then, if parents
are risk averse, educated parents would have a higher willingness to pay for their children
education and the results of our paper would mutatis mutandis hold in this set-up.
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to attract good students, then, because of the peer group effect, all students
will apply to that school, and, if schools select students on the basis of ability,
then school A will admit all the ablest applicants. This, from the households’
viewpoint, is exactly the same as when a single school in the neighbourhood
practices tracking: in both cases, only students with above median ability ben-
efit from the higher quality peer group. Our paper therefore is also relevant to
the policy debate, vigorous in many countries, on whether schools should be
allowed to select the students they admit.13
2.3 The housing market
Households have a simple decision: they choose in which of the two districts to
reside. Each household needs a unit of housing. To examine the emergence of
segregation, we require that the rich could potentially segregate from the poor,
and so assume that housing is available in unlimited supply in district 0, and
in fixed supply α − ε, in district 1. District 1, that is, has just fewer houses
than there are rich households.14 This is a technical assumption, ensuring local
uniqueness of the equilibrium: suppliers of housing are on the short side in
district 1, and this “closes” the model with the determination in their favour
of the rental price in district 1. We therefore think of ε as being small, and
consider equilibria in the limit as ε tends to 0, though, to lighten notation,
we will not declare this formally in the statement of our results: Appendix 2
sketches how the equilibrium price and average peer quality vary with ε. The
price of housing in district 0 is given by building costs, which we normalise
to 0 to dispense with a redundant parameter. The house price in district 1 is
endogenously determined in such a way that the market clears and is denoted
by p ∈ R. The property price can be positive or negative; a negative price
simply means a rental price below the (flow cost of the) building cost in district
0: given that building costs are sunk, a negative price is not inconsistent with
equilibrium.15 Without further loss of generality, we assume that α = 1
2
: this
13Recent analyses of school selection from outside the US are Allen (2006) Clark (2010)
for the UK and Jackson (2010) for Trinidad and Tobago.
14This introduces asymmetry between the districts. An alternative way of doing so would
be to assume that district 1 has a desirable amenity (Brueckner et al 1999).
15We do not specify how the price is arrived at; it can be reached, for example, if each
household bids for a house in district 1, and the highest (α− ε) bidders all pay the price bid
8
simplifies the algebra, while maintaining the important assumption that the
number of rich households is greater than the housing stock in one district.
2.4 The game
To recap: we study a static game, where the players are the households, and
their strategy set is {0, 1}, the district where they reside. In equilibrium, house-
holds correctly anticipate the choices of all other households, and the effect of
all these choices on all the payoff relevant variables, the track ability thresholds,
the consequent quality of the track their child will be assigned to, and the rela-
tive price of housing. Because they are infinitesimally small, households ignore
the effect of their own actions on the equilibrium variables, and take prices and
school qualities as given. They also take as given the school allocation policy,
that is whether or not tracking is practiced. The policy is determined outside
the model, for example imposed by government or by a local school board.
Formally, we study and compare two separate games, one where schools
track students and one where they do not. We look for Nash equilibria of
these games: each household optimises given the choices made by the other
households. We allow households to use mixed strategies; in a game with a
continuum of players, this is equivalent to requiring that a proportion of players
who are indifferent choose one or other of the pure strategies available.
3 Results
3.1 Preliminaries and definitions
In this, like in many other models of its type (e.g. Be´nabou 1996a), there ex-
ist symmetric equilibria where the households, rich and poor, are distributed
across districts in such a way that quality is the same, and the price of housing
is 0 in both districts. One such equilibrium arises if each household randomises
by choosing to reside in district 1 with probability 1
2
− ε. This ensures that the
two districts end up with exactly the same distribution of ability, and therefore
have the same school quality; houses cost the same, so all households receive the
by the (α− ε)-th highest bidder. The other households buy a house in district 0 at price 0.
Or it could be calculated by a traditional Walrasian auctioneer.
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same utility in each district, and no one has an incentive to deviate.16 Other
equilibria, qualitatively similar, are obtained by varying the randomisation,
while preserving equality of the mean ability in the two districts. Besides being
uninteresting, these symmetric equilibria are extremely fragile: they would be
disrupted by a coordinated deviation of a small group (of strictly positive mea-
sure) of households whose average ability is higher than the mean. Hereafter
we disregard them, and concentrate instead on the asymmetric ones, which
instead are robust to these coordinated deviations by a small group of players.
In the rest of this subsection, we collect a number of definitions and vari-
ables, useful in the rest of the paper. We begin with the following functions:
∆i (p) = v (yi)− v (yi − p) , i = R,P .
Intuitively, ∆i (p) is the utility cost of paying p for housing instead of paying
0. According to the following Lemma, this is lower for high income households:
this is an immediate consequence of their lower marginal utility of income.
Lemma 1 (i) ∆i (p) R 0 according to p R 0 and (ii) ∆P (p) R ∆R (p) accord-
ing to p R 0.
The proofs of all the results are collected in the technical Appendix at the
end of the paper. Next define the average abilities of rich and poor households,
θR and θP :
θi = 2
∫ b
b
bφi (b) db, i = R,P ,
and the average ability in the population:
θav =
∫ b
b
b (φP (b) + φR (b)) db =
θP + θR
2
.
In the next bit of notation, we divide the entire population into four equally
sized groups, as follows. In the first two groups are the households whose
children are in the top quarter and in the next quarter of the overall ability
distribution. Formally, let B3 be the lower boundary of the highest quartile of
16Notice that such symmetric equilibrium exists in our model both with and without
tracking.
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Figure 1: The distribution of abilities in rich (thick line) and poor (thin line)
households, and the aggregate distribution (dashed line).
the aggregate ability distribution, and B2 be the median ability in the popula-
tion: that is, B3 and B2 solve:
ΦP
(
B3
)
+ ΦR
(
B3
)
=
3
4
,
ΦP
(
B2
)
+ ΦR
(
B2
)
=
1
2
.
Figure 1 shows these groups of households: it depicts the densities of the ability
distribution in rich (thick line) and poor (thin line) households, and the aggre-
gate density, the dashed line. The darkest area (from B3 to b, with measure
1
4
) are the households with the brightest children and the second darkest area
(which also has measure 1
4
), the households whose children have ability in the
third quartile, that is, above B2 and below B3.
The average ability of children in these two groups is given by
θ3 = 4
∫ b
B3
b (φP (b) + φR (b)) db, (2)
θ2 = 4
∫ B3
B2
b (φP (b) + φR (b)) db. (3)
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The two groups below the median are not the analogous of those above the
median. Begin by defining the average ability of the children whose ability is
below the median:
θm = 2
∫ B2
b
b (φP (b) + φR (b)) db.
Next, define B∗P by:
1
4
=
∫ B2
B∗
P
φP (b) db.
In words, B∗P , which equals to Φ
−1
P
(
ΦP (B
2)− 1
4
)
, is the level of ability such
that there are exactly 1
4
poor children between B∗P and the population median.
Their average ability is
θ∗P = 4
∫ B2
B∗
P
bφP (b) db.
The lightest grey area in Figure 1 shows this group of households. The remain-
ing households, the poor ones with very low ability children and the rich ones
with children with ability below the median, form the white area below the
dashed curve, which has measure 1
4
.
We end this subsection by defining formally the two types of equilibria that
constitute the focus of our paper.
Definition 1 A full segregation equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the loca-
tion choice game such that all rich households live in district 1, and all poor
households live in district 0.
Definition 2 For given B2 and B3, a desegregation equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium of the location choice game, such that the allocation of households
to districts and of children to tracks is given by
ability interval rich households poor households(
B3, b
]
district 1, high track district 1, high track
(B2, B3] district 0, high track district 0, high track
[b, B2]
all in the same
district, low track
some in district 1, low track
some in district 0, low track
12
In a desegregation equilibrium, both districts are home to a positive measure
of both poor and rich households. We shall show that, both with positive and
with negative prices, all rich households with below-median ability children
live in the more expensive district, where the quality of the low track is higher.
Their children are in the low track in either district, but in the more expensive
one, be it 0 or 1, the peer group is higher: this is necessary to ensure that
the poor households with low ability children are indifferent. As we mentioned
above, a negative price has the natural interpretation of house prices in the
district with fixed supply falling below the construction cost of new homes in
the district where new construction is possible.
This notation introduced, in the next three subsections we study first the
game where schools do not track their students, and subsequently determine
the conditions that must hold for the two possible equilibria (mixed and fully
segregated) to occur in the game where schools track their students.
3.2 Equilibrium without tracking
Let us suppose that schools do not track students. This corresponds to the
model of neighbourhood schooling in Epple and Romano (2003).
Proposition 1 Let schools assign students to classes randomly. The unique
non-symmetric equilibrium is a full segregation equilibrium. The price of hous-
ing in district 1 is given by
p = ∆−1R (θR − θP ) > 0. (4)
Intuitively, Proposition 1 holds because, since wealthier households are more
willing to pay for school quality, and since they cannot pay for school quality
directly, they pay for it through the purchase of a good that is complementary
in consumption to school quality, namely housing. Houses in district 1 become
sufficiently expensive, pricing lower income households out of the market. Com-
plete income segregation ensues. This result would hold even if some of the
fairly specific assumptions under which it is obtained were relaxed; for example,
with less than perfect complementarity between school quality in a district and
housing in that district. It would hold a fortiori if wealthier households valued
13
school quality more.17
As we show next, tracking may prevent the operation of this mechanism,
the reason being that, with tracking, ability to pay is insufficient to ensure the
benefit of a better peer group.
3.3 Equilibrium with tracking: (i) desegregation
We begin with the desegregation equilibrium, where each district is inhabited
by both poor and rich households. The main results of the paper are contained
in Propositions 2 and 3. Proposition 2 provides necessary and sufficient con-
ditions on the ability distribution for existence of a desegregation equilibrium
with positive housing price. Proposition 3, the “negative price” counterpart of
Proposition 2, establishes that, for any income and ability distribution, there
exists of a continuum of desegregation equilibria with negative price.
Proposition 2 A desegregation equilibrium with positive price exists if and
only if
θ3 + θ∗P
2
≥ θav. (5)
The qualitative feature of this equilibrium is that in district 1 one finds all the
households with very high ability children, all the rich households with below
median ability children, and some of the poor households with below median
ability children.
This is illustrated in Figure 2 . The ability distributions are the same as in
Figure 1, but here the ability density of rich households is drawn only as stacked
above that of poor households. Households with children with ability in the top
quartile, the two darkest areas, all live in district 1, pay the high rental price,
and their children study in the top track. The rest of the population of district
1 are the rich households where children have ability below the population
median, B2 – of which there are fewer than 1
4
, the white area below the dashed
line –, and, to make up the numbers, some poor households where the children
have below median ability. These households, the lightest shade of grey, are
indifferent between the two districts, and, as Figure 2 shows, they live in both
17And it does not depend on there being only two income levels either: with a generic
income distribution, there would be a cut-off level of income, with households with higher
income than that concentrating in district 1 (Epple and Romano 2003).
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Figure 2: The residential choices of the six groups of households in the deseg-
regation equilibrium
districts: because of the positive correlation between income and ability, there
are more than 1
4
of them, and their children fill the low track in the school
in district 0. The rest of the households are those in the third quartile of the
ability distribution. They are drawn as the intermediate shades of grey, all live
in district 0, and are assigned to the top track there.
To illustrate the intuition behind Proposition 2 note that in equilibrium no
household must have an incentive to move, and so the equilibrium property
price must ensure that poor households with children of below median ability
are indifferent between the districts, which they must be, since they are dis-
tributed across both. Since they are indifferent, they can randomise, and to
each possible randomisation (that is each randomisation which ensures that 1
4
of the poor households reside in district 0) there corresponds a different qual-
ity for the low track in the two districts, and hence a different property price.
Thus, the equilibrium is not unique: instead there is a continuum of equilibria
with these qualitative features. Since the low track must have higher quality
in district 1 (that is, θµ1 − θ
µ
0 ≥ 0), Lemma 1 implies that rich household with
children of below median ability prefer district 1 strictly and so do not want to
move in equilibrium. The households with high ability children do not want to
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move either: the poor prefer to stay put in district 1 if they are willing to pay
for a house more than their low ability counterparts, that is, if the quality gap
is greater between the high tracks than between the low tracks. That will be
the case if
θ3 − θ2 ≥ θ
µ
1 − θ
µ
0 , (6)
a condition which, along with Lemma 1, implies that rich households with high
ability children also prefer to stay put. Finally, consider the rich and poor
households with children of ability between B2 and B3. They live in district
0 where they are assigned to the high track. In district 1, in turn, they would
be in the low track and pay a positive housing price. Given that the quality
of the low track in district 1, θµ1 , is always below θ2, these households strictly
prefer to live in district 0.
Existence of this equilibrium therefore depends on the existence of a ran-
domisation function for which (6) holds, which is precisely what condition (5)
guarantees: the latter ensures that with the randomisation determining the
lowest possible positive value of θµ1 − θ
µ
0 , condition (6) holds and so that no
household has an incentive to move.
To describe the equilibrium more formally and gain a better understanding
of condition (5), suppose poor households whose children have ability b ∈ [b, B2]
randomise and go to district 0 with probability µ (b) ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
∫ B2
b
µ (b)φP (b) db =
1
4
. (7)
Notice that, since positive income ability correlation implies that there are more
than 1
4
poor households below the population median B2, µ (b) is well defined.
Given (7), the rent premium that ensures that poor households with low ability
children are indifferent between the two districts is:
p = ∆−1P (θ
µ
1 − θ
µ
0 ) , (8)
with
θ
µ
0 = 4
∫ B2
b
bµ (b)φP (b) db, (9)
θ
µ
1 = 4
∫ B2
b
b ((1− µ (b))φP (b) + φR (b)) db. (10)
16
provided θµ1 ≥ θ
µ
0 . Clearly, as µ (b) changes, so do p and the low track qualities
in the two neighbourhoods.
According to Proposition 2, a desegregation equilibrium with positive house
price exists if condition (5) holds; this condition requires the school quality
differential between schools 1 and 0 be larger for students of high ability, who
go in the high track, than for students of low ability, assigned to the low track.
Note that this is a mild condition: every child in the high track of school 1 has
ability above all the children in the high track of school 0. On the contrary,
children in the low tracks of the two districts have abilities between b and B2.
That is, children in the high tracks are fully segregated by ability, those in the
low tracks are mixed.
Put differently, condition (5) requires that children in two groups have, on
average, an ability exceeding the average in the whole population. These two
groups are the children in the top quartile, from both poor and rich households,
and the ablest 1
4
of the below-the median children from poor households. That
this is a mild condition can be gleaned by inspecting Figure 2. The former
group, the ablest 1
4
children, whose ability is above B3, are in the darkest areas
in the figures, and have average ability equal to θ3. The latter group of children
are the ablest below median from poor households, the lightest grey areas in
Figure 2; their average ability is θ∗P . For (5) to hold, it must be that the
average ability of the children in these two groups exceeds the overall average
ability. In order for (5) to be violated, there must be sufficiently high correlation
between income and ability. To see this, note that, with no correlation, the
white area vanishes, and so (5) necessarily holds. By continuity, this is also
true for sufficiently small correlation.
The multiplicity of mixed strategy equilibria is a direct consequence of the
assumption of the separability between a student’s ability and her school’s qual-
ity, measured by peer ability. This ensures that households benefit equally from
school quality, and in particular that all the poor households with low ability
children are indifferent between the districts, and so multiple randomisations
are possible. To every randomisation there corresponds a different school qual-
ity and consequently a different price ensures that the household who randomise
are indeed indifferent.18
18This multiplicity would not occur in a model where ability and school quality are com-
plements, that is one where brighter children benefit more from a high quality peer group.
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The next result illustrates that in the desegregation equilibrium there is
genuine mixing, not just a few token households moving to the “other” district.
Corollary 1 In a desegregation equilibrium with positive price,
(
1
4
− (ΦP (B
3)− ΦP (B
2))
)
poor (rich) households live in district 1 (district 0).
To gain a sense of the extent of the desegregation, consider the following
example: let ability be normalised in [0, 1] and distributed in the two population
groups according to
φi (b) =
bν1i (1− b)ν2i
2β (ν1i, ν2i)
, i = R,P , (11)
with ν1i and ν2i taking values (5, 3) for the rich and (3, 4) for the poor (these are
the densities depicted in Figures 1 and 2). In this case, in district 1 there live
0.346 rich households and 0.154 poor ones, a ratio of 2.25 (and obviously the
reverse in district 0). While, clearly, tracking stratifies children by ability in the
classroom, it does not necessarily do so geographically. Indeed, in the numerical
example considered here, the average ability in the districts is 0.636 and 0.455
without tracking and 0.563 and 0.528 in the equilibrium with tracking where
district 1 has the highest possible average ability:19 so tracking reduces the
gap in average ability in the two districts. The composition of the district also
changes in a non-monotonic way: for example, the standard deviation of ability
is 0.139 and 0.144 in district 1 and 0 respectively without tracking, and 0.217
and 0.094 with tracking. This is not a general result, and different patterns
can easily be found.
We argued above that there is no reason why house prices in district 1
(where new houses cannot be built) could not fall below the marginal cost,
If the effect is small enough, it does not change the preferences of the other groups of house-
holds, but it breaks the indifference of the poor households with low ability children: all the
households below a given cut-off strictly prefer district 0, as they benefit less from school
quality, and the households above the cut-off strictly prefer district 1, where school quality
is higher. The cut-off is determined to clear the housing market, and the housing price to
ensure that the households with children at the ability cut-off are indifferent between the
districts (the argument for substitutability is analogous).
19That is, we refer to the equilibrium with the largest ability difference between the two
low tracks and thus with the greatest housing price within the set of desegregation equilibria
with positive price.
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normalised to 0, of building new houses in district 0. The next proposition
establishes that a continuum of desegregation equilibria with negative prices
exists for any parameter configuration. These equilibria are very similar to
those identified in Proposition 2, the difference being that all rich households
with below-median ability children now live in district 0, where houses are more
expensive.
Proposition 3 There exists a continuum of desegregation equilibria with neg-
ative property prices.
The qualitative difference between an equilibrium with positive property
price, which according to Proposition 2 exists only if (5) holds and one with
negative prices, which Proposition 3 shows always to exist, is the location of
the rich households with low ability children: they are in district 1 when the
price is positive, and in district 0 when it is negative. In both cases, poor
households with low ability children are indifferent between districts and the
relation between price and school quality must be such that they are indifferent,
while at the same time making sure that the poor households with high ability
children are happy to stay in district 0, and send their children to the high
track.
3.4 Equilibrium with tracking: (ii) full segregation
To continue with the analysis of the equilibrium set, the proposition in this
subsection provides conditions such that there exists a tracking equilibrium
displaying perfect income segregation across districts. The condition requires a
very high correlation of ability and income, and substantial income inequality:
that is, full segregation can happen even when the schools practice tracking,
but for this to occur rich and poor households must be very different.
We need some additional notation. Let Bi2 be the median ability of the
households with income yi (i.e. B
i
2 = Φ
−1
i
(
1
4
)
); note that because of the cor-
relation between income and ability BP2 < B
R
2 . Let θ
i
H and θ
i
L be the average
ability of children in the top and in the bottom half of the distribution of ability
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for each income group i:
θiH = 4
∫ b
Bi
2
bφi (b) db, i = R,P ;
θiL = 4
∫ Bi
2
b
bφi (b) db, i = R,P .
Lemma 2 θRj > θ
P
j j = H,L.
The Lemma is a consequence of the correlation between income and ability.
Proposition 4 If the schools practice tracking, a full segregation equilibrium
exists if and only if
∆P
(
∆−1R
(
θRL − θ
P
H
))
> max
{(
θRH − θ
P
H
)
,
(
θRL − θ
P
L
)}
. (12)
In this equilibrium, the housing price is
p = ∆−1R (θ
R
L − θ
P
H). (13)
Condition (12) has a natural interpretation. Notice first that for it to hold,
its LHS must be strictly positive, that is, θRL must exceed θ
P
H . In words, the
average ability of the low ability half of the children from rich households, θRL ,
must exceed the average ability of the high ability half of the children from
poor households, θPH . This requires the correlation between income and ability
to be very high. Moreover, (12) is certainly violated when ∆P = ∆R, that is
when income levels are equal, irrespective of the ability income correlation. By
continuity, this is also the case when the income levels are similar.
3.5 Discussion
Our formal analysis in the previous subsections can be summarised by saying
that tracking can lead to desegregation. Desegregation has manifold advan-
tages, consequences of exposing children from disadvantaged backgrounds to
the life-style and ambitions of children from different, more privileged back-
grounds; this, however, is not the place to discuss the broader implications of
segregation.20
20Segregated cities generate significant differences in the educational inputs available to
children of different socio-economic backgrounds (through peer group effects at the classroom,
20
Opponents of tracking (e.g. Oakes, 2005) argue that tracking is detrimental
to social mobility, because, with correlation between income and ability, dis-
advantaged children tend to be overrepresented in low tracks, where tracking
reduces the quality of the peer group: to the extent that high quality education,
more available to those in the high track, is a gateway to university, disadvan-
taged children will be correspondingly underrepresented in higher academic
institutions. Countervailing this, however, in a desegregation equilibrium, chil-
dren in poor households with above median ability are educated in schools with
a higher quality peer group than they would if schools did not practice tracking.
Thus they not only have classmates and neighbourhood friends from a better
social background, but they also receive better schooling: both these factors
should increase their likelihood to attend university.21
From a different viewpoint, the question is whether, for given correlation
between income and innate or pre-school ability, tracking increases or decreases
correlation between income and school achievement : does tracking dampen or
heighten social inequality? In the set up of our model, school achievement de-
pends on school quality and ability. In a full segregation equilibrium without
tracking, privileged children receive higher quality education than their poor
counterparts, due to the peer effect. In a desegregation equilibrium, on the
other hand, rich and poor youths of equal ability who are assigned to a high
track enjoy the same school quality. Correlation between income and school
achievement is therefore lower in the latter equilibrium. To the extent that
admission to university depends on school achievement, and that “better” uni-
versities require higher achievement, then disadvantaged young people will have
a better chance to be admitted to a high quality university in the desegrega-
tion equilibrium. This must be balanced with the observation that, as can be
seen in Figure 2, the gap in average ability in the four classes (two in each
district) is increased by tracking: brighter students receive better education
neighbourhood effects, role and behavioural models and so on). As a result, they tend to
polarise educational opportunities and to perpetuate income and human capital inequality
(Be´nabou 1996a, 1996b). Furthermore, ghettos and poverty traps emerge naturally (Be´nabou
1993; Durlauf 1996). Note however, as shown for example by Cutler et al (2008), that
segregation is not always associated to negative outcomes.
21Indeed, as we noted in the introduction, the empirical evidence on the impact of tracking
on social mobility is mixed (Lee 2011a, 2011b; Brunello and Checchi 2007; Pekkarinen et
al 2009).
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with tracking, weaker students worse education. And since there are relatively
more brighter students among the wealthier households, the latter, as a group,
appear to benefit more than poorer households from a change to tracking.
3.6 Towards a welfare analysis
The previous section notes the trade-off between providing some children from
poor households with the best education, but leaving a majority of them in the
low tracks at school. To evaluate this trade-off a welfare analysis is needed;
while a complete theoretical study cannot be properly conducted in this highly
simplified set-up, some formal consideration can be carried out in conclusion
to the paper. We begin by giving conditions ensuring that all households are
better-off with tracking than without. These equilibria will necessarily have
negative property prices, since the welfare gains of poor households with low
ability children are realised at the expense of landlords, and therefore we do
not speak of a Pareto improvement.
Define θ
λ
0 as the maximum possible quality of the low track in district 0 in
a desegregated equilibrium with negative property prices. This is given by:
θ
λ
0 = 4
[∫ B2
b
bφR (b) db+
∫ B2
Φ−1
P (
1
4)
bφP (b) db
]
.
This maximum is attained when the brightest of the poor kids with below-the-
median ability attend the low track in district 0, along with the rich kids with
below-the-median ability. The other poor children, those whose ability is below
the median of the poor children, all live in district 1.
The next proposition gives a sufficient condition for all households to be
better off in a desegregated equilibria (with negative prices) than in the full
segregation equilibrium that results in the absence of tracking.
Proposition 5 Let
θ
λ
0 > θP ; (14)
then there are desegregation equilibria with negative house prices which every
household prefers to the equilibrium where schools do not track students.
To interpret condition (14), consider again Figure ??: it requires that the
average ability of those in the white area, plus some (the appropriate number to
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have 1
4
students in the low track in district 0) of those in the lightest grey area
be higher than the average ability of the poor, those below the thin solid curve.
The easiest way to satisfy the condition is if the poor, low ability students who
go in district 0 are the best, that is the vertical slice at the right of the lightest
grey area: this “slice” must be sufficiently thick, and so condition (14) requires
positive correlation between income and ability. In this case, the average ability
in the low track in district 0 is θ
λ
0 . When condition (14) holds, everybody is
better off with tracking and the consequent desegregation in equilibrium: the
lowest ability poor households benefit because, though they have lower school
quality, they also pay a below-cost price for housing. The low ability rich also
have lower quality schooling, but do not pay a positive price for housing, since
they live in district 0. The higher ability poor, either live in district 1 and so
have negative house price and higher school quality than they would in the
no-tracking equilibrium, or, if they live in district 0, they have better school
quality, since they do not have the least able poor children as peers, but some
middle quality rich children.22
We can say something more specific for households with children with above
median ability.
Corollary 2 Let θ2 > θP : then all households above the median ability strictly
prefer any desegregation equilibrium to the no tracking equilibrium.
The condition that ensures that above median households are made better
off by tracking is mild. It requires the average ability in the third quartile of
the population, which is the quality of the high track in the poor district, to be
greater than the average ability of children from poor households. The condi-
tion that θ2 > θP is sufficient and necessary for households with intermediate
ability and, therefore, they will prefer no tracking if it does not hold. In that
case, moreover, θ3 − θP < θ3 − θ2 so that an equilibrium may exist in which
22With the ability distributions given in (11) in the example following Corollary 1, assuming
that the utility of consumption is v (x) = lnx, and yR = 20 and yP = 5, in the tracking
equlibrium the price for housing in district 1 would be −0.871, the three groups of rich
households would have utility 3.812, 3.599 and 3.441, with the poor households having utility
2.544, 2.213 and 2.055. In the no tracking equilibrium, price is 3.567, and the household
utility is 3.424 for the rich and 2.038 for the poor. Details of the calculations are available
on requests.
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θ3− θ2 > θ
µ
1 − θ
µ
0 > θ3− θP . In this case, the poor households with high ability
children will enjoy lower utility with tracking and so will their rich counterparts
if the income gap is small enough. Thus, another important implication of our
analysis is that no group of households will consistently prefer tracking across
all parameter configurations.
Together with the multiplicity of equilibria,23 at least for some parameter
combinations, this illustrates that the ambitious task of the welfare analysis of
tracking needs both a more nuanced model and a solid empirical underpinning.
The aim of the paper, however, is to illustrate the complex interaction between
school policies, the household’s residential choices, and the social and demo-
graphic environment, and to underline that this interaction cannot be ignored
in any meaningful analysis of educational policies.
In this vein, note how the relative price of property in district 1 play a differ-
ent role with and without tracking: when schools cannot track their students,
it must be sufficiently high in equilibrium to deter an ε mass of rich households
from choosing to move to district 1, where schools are better. When schools
can track their students, it must be sufficiently low in equilibrium so as to
induce some poor households to move to district 1 (see Figure 2). However,
this argument cannot be used to infer that housing price is lower with tracking.
A simple numerical example shows that the opposite can indeed happen: let
ability be again distributed in the two population groups according to (11),
and let the consumption component of utility be given by ln (y). If the param-
eter ν1 and ν2 and y take values (4, 4) and 11 for the poor and (4, 4.5) and 12
for the rich households, then the equilibrium price is 0.3478 without tracking
and can take any value in (0, 0.3506] with tracking, depending on the mixed
strategy followed by the households with low ability children, who are indiffer-
ent between the two districts. So tracking can in fact increase the equilibrium
price. This is a rather extreme example, where both the ability distribution
and the income levels are close for poor and rich households. For parameter
combinations which make the groups more diverse, tracking does reduce price.
For example, if the parameter ν1 and ν2 and y are (7, 4) and 20 for the rich
households (and the same as before for the poor), then the equilibrium price is
2.549 without tracking and can go only up to 1.394 with tracking.
23Which appears to be a feature in this kind of models, see de Bartolome and Ross (2004).
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4 Concluding remarks
This paper makes a simple point. In an environment where households care
about the quality of the education their children receive, schools follow a
residence-based admission policy by favouring local residents, and the qual-
ity of education depends on the peer group, the tendency towards residential
income segregation, that is the tendency of households to cluster according
to income, is weakened if schools assign their students to classes according to
ability. In short, tracking generates residential social mixing, implying that the
well-intentioned movement advocating “de-tracking” schools (Argys et al 1996)
may end up causing an increase in income stratification.
While we use a highly stylised model, the principle behind our result has
a general validity: in a neighbourhood populated exclusively by households
of a “good” socio-economic background, when schools track students, it will
necessarily be the case that many parents find that their child is allocated
to a low track. Similarly, if the local schools are selective, they may find
their children are not admitted to the school of their choice. These parents
might consider that their children’s education is adversely affected and might
wish to consider alternatives. If private schools are too expensive or otherwise
unavailable, for example because they accept only high ability children, then
they could send their child to a school where the average ability of the children
is lower, so that they are assigned to the top track in that school.24 If there
is positive correlation between ability and socio-economic background, then
schools in districts where children are from a lower socioeconomic background
may indeed assign their child to the top track. Moving to that area would then
be an option for these parents. If they, and other similar households, move,
then children from different socio-economic backgrounds would attend the same
school, interact as neighbours, play together in the local sports teams and so
on. Note that, if there is school choice and residents are not given priority at
their local school, the social mixing effect of school tracking is dampened but
not cancelled, as children from different social backgrounds would still spend
the school hours together and have the opportunity to strike friendships among
themselves.
24Private schools may also disrupt perfect income stratification (Martinez-Mora 2006), and
in general interact with state schools in a complex manner Epple et al (2002).
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Income desegregation is a hitherto unnoticed effect of tracking, and may
offset some of the distributional adverse effects of tracking pointed out by the
literature, which also emerge in our set up, such as the concentration of the ben-
eficial effects on households with high ability children, be they well-off house-
holds, who generally enjoy lower residential prices, or poorer households, whose
children receive better education.
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Appendix 1
Since all the arguments are based on utility differentials between districts, the ad-
ditive nature of the utility function implies that there is no loss in generality in
normalising away to 0 the term q (b).
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) follows from ∆i (0) = 0 and v
′ (yi) > 0. Consider (ii) next.
Write ∆i (p) as
∆i (p) =
∫ p
0
v′ (yi − x) dx
and so
∆P (p)−∆R (p) =
∫ p
0
(
v′ (yP − x)− v
′ (yR − x)
)
dx =
∫ p
0
∫ yP
yR
v′′ (y − x) dydx
Since yP < yR and v
′′ (y) < 0 the sign of the above is the same as the sign of p, and
the Lemma is established.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the full segregation allocation of households
to districts, with price given in (4). We show that this is an equilibrium. The rich
households are indifferent between the two districts, and so a measure ε of them can
settle in district 0. A poor household’s utility gain from moving from district 0 to
district 1 is
(v (yP − p) + θR)− (v (yP ) + θP ) ,
which can be written as
(θR − θP )− (v (yP )− v (yP − p)) = ∆R (p)−∆P (p) .
By Lemma (1), the above is negative, and so no poor household wishes to deviate.
Next consider uniqueness. Clearly there cannot be a full segregation equilibrium
with a price different from (4): a lower price would ensure that the ε rich households
left in district 0 would want to deviate and move to district 1. A higher price would
induce all rich households to move to district 0. Similarly, there cannot be another
equilibrium apart from the trivial one with p = 0 and identical quality. If p > 0,
then, by Lemma (1), it cannot be that both rich and poor households are indifferent:
if the rich are indifferent the poor strictly prefer district 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider an allocation such that poor households whose
children have ability b ∈
[
b, B2
]
are indifferent between the two districts. Suppose
they randomise and go to district 0 with probability µ (b) ∈ [0, 1] satisfying (7). µ (b)
A1
determines the average ability in the low track in the two districts, (9) and (10). The
requirement that these households be indifferent is
v (yP − p) + θ
µ
1 = v (yP ) + θ
µ
0 ; (A1)
which gives the price (8), provided the difference θµ1 − θ
µ
0 is positive. Next, notice
that, given price (8), rich households whose children have ability b ∈
[
b, B2
]
prefer
district 1:
v (yR − p) + θ
µ
1 > v (yR) + θ
µ
0 , (A2)
since (A1) and Lemma 1 imply (A2).
Now consider households with high ability children, that is children with b ∈(
B3, b
]
. Take poor households first. In the candidate equilibrium they live in district
1, which gives them utility v (yP − p) + θ
3, and so they must weakly prefer staying
put over moving to district 0:
v (yP − p) + θ
3 ≥ v (yP ) + θ
2. (A3)
Given (A1), this will be the case provided
θ3 − θ2 ≥ θµ1 − θ
µ
0 . (A4)
Consider next rich households with high ability children: at the equilibrium allo-
cation they have utility v (yR − p) + θ
3. If they deviate and move to district 0, they
will be allocated to the high track and have utility v (yR) + θ
2. If (A4) holds, by
Lemma 1, v (yR − p) + θ
3 > v (yR) + θ
2, and so indeed they strictly prefer district
1. Finally, consider households with children with ability b ∈
(
θ2, θ3
]
, both rich and
poor. They live in district 0, and are assigned to the high track there, obtaining
utility v (yi) + θ
2. If they moved to district 1, they would be in the low track, which
would give them utility v (yi − p) + θ
µ
1 ; since θ
2 > θ
µ
1 , they would pay more for
housing and have a lower peer group, and so clearly they prefer to stay put.
So existence of equilibrium hinges on the existence of a randomisation function
µ (b) such that (A4) holds. In (A4), the LHS is exogenously given. The RHS varies
as µ (b) changes, reaching a minimum when µ (b) = µmin (b), and a maximum when
µ (b) = µmax (b), where
µmin (b) =
{
0 b ∈ [b, B∗P )
1 b ∈
[
B∗P , B
2
] , (A5)
µmax (b) =
{
1 b ∈
[
b,Φ−1P
(
1
4
)]
0 b ∈
(
Φ−1P
(
1
4
)
, B2
] . (A6)
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Figure A1: Households’ allocation with randomisations µmin (b) and µmax (b).
That is θµ1 − θ
µ
0 in (A4) reaches a minimum when the least able children from
poor households all live in district 1, and a maximum when they all live in district 0,
as illustrated in Figure A1. This depicts the ability distribution for poor households,
and, as a dotted line, the randomisation rules, µmin (b) on the LHS and µmax (b) on
the RHS panel. In each case, households in the grey area live in district 1, as do
those where the child has ability exceeding B2. When µ (b) = µmax (b), then θ
µ
1 and
θ
µ
0 become:
θ
µ
0 = 4
∫ Φ−1
P (
1
4)
b
bφP (b) db,
θ
µ
1 = 4
∫ Φ−1
P (
1
4)
b
bφR (b) db+ 4
∫ B2
Φ−1
P (
1
4)
b (φP (b) + φR (b)) db.
And so the difference θµ1 − θ
µ
0 is
4
(∫ B2
Φ−1
P (
1
4)
b (φP (b) + φR (b)) db−
∫ Φ−1
P (
1
4)
b
b (φP (b)− φR (b)) db
)
.
The first term in the above is θµ1−A, and the second θ
µ
0−A, whereA =
∫ Φ−1
P (
1
4)
b bφR (b) db.
If the second term is negative or 0, then clearly θµ1 − θ
µ
0 > 0. If the second term is
instead positive, then note that, multiplied by 44−µA , where µA = ΦR
(
Φ−1P
(
1
4
))
=∫ Φ−1
P (
1
4)
b φR (b) db is the measure of the rich households with low ability children, each
is an average abililty. But the first term is an average of abilities above Φ−1P
(
1
4
)
, the
second term an average of abilities below Φ−1P
(
1
4
)
, and therefore their difference is
positive. Therefore it is always possible to find a randomisation such that the prop-
erty price in district 1 is positive. However θµ1 − θ
µ
0 cannot exceed θ
3 − θ2 for every
possible randomisation, and so, if θ3 − θ2 is larger than the minimum possible value
of the RHS, then there is at least one randomisation function µ (b) which ensures
that (A4) holds, and the Proposition is established. This minimum possible value is
A3
reached when µ (b) = µmin (b), and in this case (A4) becomes:
θ3 − θ2 ≥ 4
[∫ B2
b
b (φP (b) + φR (b)) db− 2
∫ B2
B∗
P
bφP (b) db
]
= 2 (θm − θ
∗
P ) . (A7)
The average ability in the population, θav can be written as
θav =
θm
2
+
θ3 + θ2
4
,
and so (A7) becomes:
θ3 − θ2 ≥ 4θav − θ
3 − θ2 − 2θ∗P .
Rearranging, (5) is obtained. Therefore, if (5) holds, then there is at least one
randomisation function µ (b) which ensures that (A4) holds, and the Proposition is
established.
Proof of Corollary 1. This is simple counting: in a desegregation equilibrium with
positive price, there are two groups of poor households living in district 1: the black
area and all but 14 of the lightest grey area in Figure 2. The black area has measure
1
2 − ΦP
(
B3
)
. The lightest area has measure ΦP
(
B2
)
.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider an allocation such that households where the
child has ability in the upper (in the third) quartile live in district 1 (in district 0),
rich households with children whose ability is below the median live in district 0,
and poor households whose children have ability b ∈
[
b, B2
]
are indifferent between
the two districts. Suppose the latter randomise and go to district 1 with probability
λ (b) ∈ [0, 1], where λ (b) satisfies
∫ B2
b
λ (b)φP (b) db =
1
4
.
For the same reason as µ (b) in Proposition 2, λ (b) is also well defined. λ (b) de-
termines the average ability in the low track in the two districts, which we denote
θλ0 and θ
λ
1 (analogously to θ
µ
0 and θ
µ
1 ). The requirement that these households be
indifferent is
v (yP − p) + θ
λ
1 = v (yP ) + θ
λ
0 ;
which gives a negative price ∆−1P
(
θλ1 − θ
λ
0
)
, analogously to (8), provided the difference
θλ1 − θ
λ
0 is negative. Given this price, Lemma 1 implies that rich households whose
children have ability b ∈
[
b, B2
]
strictly prefer district 0:
v (yR − p) + θ
λ
1 < v (yR) + θ
λ
0 .
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Next, consider households with high ability children, that is with b ∈
(
B3, b
]
. In
the candidate equilibrium they live in district 1, which gives them utility v (yi − p)+
θ3, i = P,R and so they must weakly prefer staying put over moving to district 0:
v (yi − p) + θ
3 ≥ v (yi) + θ
2; i = P,R.
This is clearly the case because in district 1 they enjoy both higher school quality
and larger private consumption.
To end the proof, consider poor households with children with ability b ∈
(
B2, B3
]
.
They live in district 0, and are assigned to the high track there, obtaining utility
v (yP )+ θ
2. If they moved to district 1, they would be in the low track, which would
give them utility v (yP − p)+ θ
λ
1 . Since θ
2 > θλ1 and p < 0, we need to check that the
property price is not sufficiently negative so as to induce them to prefer district 1.
The equilibrium price is p = ∆−1P
(
θλ1 − θ
λ
0
)
, while the price that would make these
households indifferent between the two districts is ∆−1P
(
θλ1 − θ2
)
. Clearly, θ2 > θ
λ
0
and so θλ1 − θ
λ
0 > θ
λ
1 − θ2 and ∆
−1
P
(
θλ1 − θ2
)
< p, that is, to be willing to move to dis-
trict 1, these households would demand a lower property price than the equilibrium
one. Hence they prefer to stay put. Since θ2 > θλ1 , by Lemma 1, rich households
with children of ability b ∈
(
B2, B3
]
also prefer to stay put.
Proof of Lemma 2. Begin with i = L. We want to determine the sign of θRL − θ
P
L .
So we can write
θRL − θ
P
L =
(
4
∫ BR
2
b
bφR (b) db
)
−
(
4
∫ BP
2
b
bφP (b) db
)
= 4
(∫ BP
2
b
b
(
φR (b)− φP (b)
)
db+
∫ BR
2
BP
2
bφR (b) db
)
.
Integrate by parts both integrals, and write the above as
θRL − θ
P
L
4
= BR2 ΦR
(
BR2
)
−BP2 ΦP
(
BP2
)
+
∫ BP
2
b
(
ΦP (b)− ΦR (b)
)
db−
∫ BR
2
BP
2
ΦR (b) db
(A8)
but Bi2 is the median of Φi (b), i = R,P , and so
ΦR
(
BR2
)
= ΦP
(
BP2
)
and (A8) can be written as:
θRL − θ
P
L
4
= BR2 ΦR
(
BR2
)
−BP2 ΦR
(
BR2
)
−
∫ BR
2
BP
2
ΦR (b) db+
∫ BP
2
b
(
ΦP (b)− ΦR (b)
)
db
=
∫ BR
2
BP
2
(
ΦR
(
BR2
)
− ΦR (b)
)
db+
∫ BP
2
b
(
ΦP (b)− ΦR (b)
)
db
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the first term is positive because ΦR (b) is increasing, the second because of stochastic
dominance.
Similarly for θRH − θ
P
H , which is
θRH − θ
P
H =
(
4
∫ b
BR
2
bφR (b) db
)
−
(
4
∫ b
BP
2
bφP (b) db
)
=
(
4
∫ b
BR
2
b
(
ΦR (b)− ΦP (b)
)
db
)
− 4
∫ BR
2
BP
2
bφP (b) db
Again integrate by parts both integrals, and write
θRH − θ
P
H
4
=
∫ b
BR
2
(
ΦP (b)− ΦR (b)
)
db+
∫ BR
2
BP
2
(
ΦP (b)− ΦP
(
BP2
))
db
which again is positive.
Proof of Proposition 4. Given ε > 0, at a perfect income segregation equilibrium,
the average ability in the four tracks is “close”25 to the following values:
District 1: High track: θRH , Low track: θ
R
L .
District 0: High track: θPH , Low track: θ
R
L .
(A9)
Perfect income segregation characterises equilibrium if and only if there is a price
for district 1 housing such that no household wants to deviate, and, moreover, that
some rich households are indifferent (given that ε is positive). To check for this, there
are six types of households to consider: rich and poor households with high, middle
and low ability children. The high (low) ability children would be in the high (low)
track in either district. A household with a middle ability child, instead, would be in
the high track in district 0 and in the low track in district 1. This is a consequence
of correlation between income and ability, which implies that in a full segregation
equilibrium, the cut-off ability between tracks is higher in district 1.
25With strictly positive ε, a perfect segregation equilibrium cannot exist, as it is not
possible to squeeze 1
2
rich households into 1
2
− ε houses. Rigorously, (A9) should read
District 1: High track: θRH + g
R
H (ε), Low track: θ
R
L + g
R
L (ε).
District 0: High track: θPH + g
P
H (ε), Low track: θ
P
L + g
P
L (ε).
where the functions gji (ε), j = R,P , i = H,L are all continuous functions, defined in
[
0, 1
4
]
,
which tend to 0 as ε tends to 0. This would be unnecessarily cumbersome, and is left implicit.
A6
Consider rich households first. The following must hold:
v (yR − p) + θ
R
H > v (yR) + θ
P
H ,
v (yR − p) + θ
R
L > v (yR) + θ
P
H ,
v (yR − p) + θ
R
L > v (yR) + θ
P
L ,
with at least one equality. These can be written as:
∆R (p) = min
{(
θRH − θ
P
H
)
,
(
θRL − θ
P
H
)
,
(
θRL − θ
P
L
)}
. (A10)
The RHS of (A10) is in fact θRL − θ
P
H (because θ
R
H > θ
R
L and θ
P
H > θ
P
L ), and so (A10)
reduces to ∆R (p) = θ
R
L − θ
P
H , which determines the housing price in district 1, (13).
For this to be an equilibrium, all poor households must prefer to stay in district 0:
∆P (p) > θRH − θ
P
H , (A11)
∆P (p) > θRL − θ
P
H = ∆R (p) , (A12)
∆P (p) > θRL − θ
P
L . (A13)
Notice that the RHS in (A12) is lower than the RHS in both (A11) and (A13), and
so (A12) holds if (A11) and (A13) do, which is the case if (12) holds. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. We begin with the following Lemma, which is also of
independent interest.
Lemma A1 If the poor households with low ability children are better off with track-
ing, then all households are better-off with tracking.
Proof. Consider a desegregation equilibrium with a negative house price in
district 1where the randomisation λ (b) determines low track abilities θλ0 and θ
λ
1 in
districts 0 and 1, and let the price be pD < 0. If poor households with low ability
children are better off with tracking, then:
v (yP − pD) + θ
λ
1 = v (yP ) + θ
λ
0 > v (yP ) + θP , (A14)
that is: θλ0 > θP . Consider rich households with low ability children. Their payoff in
the no tracking case is v (yR − pN )+θR, where pN is the price in the equilibrium with
no tracking. In the desegregation equilibrium considered, their payoff is v (yR) + θ
λ
0 .
We can write:
v (yR) + θ
λ
0 > v (yR) + θP = v (yR − pN ) + θR.
A7
The first inequality follows from θλ0 > θP , and the equality at the end follows from
the fact that with no tracking, the rich must be indifferent between the two districts.
Compare the first and second term to see that rich households with low ability
children prefer tracking strictly. Next consider the rest of the households. We have
v (yi) + θP < v (yi) + θ
λ
0 < v (yi) + θ2 < v (yi − pD) + θ3, i = P,R.
The first inequality follows again from θλ0 > θP , the second from the fact that θ2 is
the average of a subset of above-the-median abilities, θλ0 the average of a subset of
below-the-median abilities, and the third from the fact that θ2 < θ3 and pD < 0.
Comparing the first and the third (fourth) term shows that households with middle
(high) ability children are better off with tracking.
We can now return to the proof of the Proposition. As (A14) shows, for low
ability poor households to prefer tracking, there must exist a randomisation λ (b)
such that θλ0 > θP . If this is true at the highest possible value for θ
λ
0 , then we are
done. Since existence of the equilibrium with a negative price requires pD < 0, and
so θλ1 − θ
λ
0 < 0, the highest possible value for θ
λ
0 is obtained when λ (b) = µmax (b)
(given by (A5)), or:
λ(b) =
{
1 b ∈
[
b,Φ−1P
(
1
4
)]
0 b ∈
(
Φ−1P
(
1
4
)
, B2
] .
Condition (14) requires that this maximum value of θλ0 be greater than θP , which
concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider first households with middling ability children.
They are better off with tracking if and only if:
v (yi) + θ2 > v (yi) + θP ; i = P,R. (A15)
That is, if and only if θ2 > θP . Consider next households with high ability children,
and again compare utility levels: these households are better off with tracking if and
only if v (yi − pT ) + θ3 > v (yi) + θP , i = P,R. Using (8) to determine pT , we have
that θ3 − θP > θ
µ
1 − θ
µ
0 is sufficient and necessary for the inequality to hold for poor
households, and sufficient for rich ones. To establish the corollary, note first that
θ2 > θP implies θ3 − θP > θ3 − θ2, and second that existence of the desegregation
equilibrium entails θ3 − θ2 > θ
µ
1 − θ
µ
0 .
Appendix 2
Figure 2 sketches how the equilibrium price (in the case of a positive price with
almost all the rich households living in district 1), and the quality of the high track
A8
vary as ε varies. The grey area is the range of possible prices for given ε > 0, and
the hatched area the range of possible qualities if the top track in district 1. The
function ζε (b) is the density of the top quartile rich households who reside in district
0, clearly, with
∫ b
B3
ζε (b) db = ε.
p
Figure 2: The price (solid area) and quality (hatched area) correspondences as
ε changes.
To obtain an intuition for the shape sketched in the Figure, note that, for a
strictly positive ε there is a multiplicity of equilibrium prices, and consequently
quality levels in the two districts: there are multiple equilibria, depending on which
of the rich households are “forced” to move out of district 1: all rich households
with high ability children have the same willingness to pay for school quality, and
so the rationing rule must be random: however, the excluded households bid the
price up to the level where all rich households are indifferent between the district.
When the excluded households happen to be those with the lowest ability children
(among the children with ability in the top quartile, formally children with ability
in
[
B3, B3 + 4ε
)
), the quality of the top track in district 1 and hence the price are
highest; vice versa, if the excluded households are those with the ablest children
(children with ability in [b− 4ε, b]), then the quality of the top track in district 1 and
hence the price are the lowest possible. All prices in between these are possible for
A9
some distribution of the “excluded” children, as shown by the grey area in Figure 2.
As ε shrinks, the range of possible prices shrinks, and given that
lim
ε→0+
∫ b
B3+4ε
bΦR (b) db = lim
ε→0+
∫ b−4ε
B3
bΦR (b) db =
∫ b
B3
bΦR (b) db
price and peer quality in the top track in district 1 tend to a unique value. In the
above expression, the first term is the maximal peer quality, the second the minimal
peer quality, and clearly, both tend to a common value, the third term.
Things are different when ε = 0, however. In this case, all rich households can
live in district 1, so it is no longer required that the price is so high as to ensure that
they are indifferent between the district, but can come down a bit to ensure that
they are strictly better off in district 1. However, the price has a second role to play,
namely to ensure that the poor households with low ability children are indifferent:
when ε is positive, the price is fixed by the indifference condition for rich households,
and so the allocation of poor households to the two districts must be such that the
resulting low track qualities ensure that these households are indifferent between the
two districts. However, when the price is free to vary, that is for ε = 0, then it can
do so, provided the poor households can allocate themselves in such a way that the
resulting track qualities in the bottom tracks make them indifferent between districts.
If the price becomes too low, then all the poor households would want to move to
district 1, which would push price up.
To to sum up, the equilibrium set converges to a point as ε→ 0, but “explodes”
when ε = 0 is 0, as sketched in Figure 2.
A10
